By Yoan Marier, Chairman of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Many fishing expeditions begin in the dark. Crews gear up before dawn, checking the weather, hoping for smooth sailing and a good haul.
The voyage begins like any other — routine, familiar. Yet on the water, the unexpected can strike, and someone doesn’t make it home.
From 2020 to 2024, there was an average of nine fishing-related deaths in Canada each year. Investigations by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) reveal a hard truth: many of the people lost were skilled fish harvesters doing what they had done for years. These tragedies are not about reckless choices, but rather systems that fail, creating conditions where crews face risks they cannot always control.
With winter fishing underway on both coasts, now is the perfect opportunity to examine what continues to go wrong, and what needs to change.
Recent TSB investigations into four different occurrences between 2020 and 2023 point to the same set of risks, regardless of vessel, coast or fishery. Decks become overloaded. Gear and catch can block freeing ports so water can’t drain. Vessels can be operated without anyone knowing their safe limits. Lifesaving gear is hard to reach when it’s needed. The pressure to keep fishing pushes crews to take chances. And drills that look solid on paper don’t hold up when a real emergency strikes.
The 15 lives lost on the Sarah Anne, Chief William Saulis, Tyhawk and Silver Condor show how quickly things can unravel when stability is pushed, when water on deck can’t drain because of too many traps or unsecured gear, when vessel changes are not checked, and there’s almost no time to reach emergency gear before hitting the water.
Our investigation into the 2020 sinking of the Sarah Anne (M20A0160) is an example of how fast things can go wrong. The vessel was likely loaded past its safe limits and had never had a stability check. It likely capsized suddenly — forcing the crew into the water unexpectedly, before they had the chance to put on lifejackets, personal flotation devices or immersion suits; to deploy the life raft; or to make a distress call. There was a VHF DSC radio on board, but without a Maritime Mobile Service Identity, it couldn’t send an automatic distress alert.
The occurrence involving the Chief William Saulis (M20A0434) revealed similar risks and outcomes. The vessel’s deck was overloaded with scallops — an estimated 4,300 kg — with unsecured piles blocking drainage and likely covering freeing ports. Water built up on deck, creating a free surface effect. As loads shifted, the vessel’s stability deteriorated until it capsized and sank. Without a stability assessment, the crew had no way of knowing how much weight the boat could safely handle. This isn’t an isolated issue: most fishing vessels in Canada still operate without a formal stability check.
The 2021 capsizing of the Tyhawk (M21A0065) shows what can happen when a vessel is modified without checking how the changes affect stability. A removable deck used for snow crab fishing had been added to the boat, but it was never assessed. That year, the opening day for the snow crab fishery was moved up by almost three weeks, increasing the chance of colder water, ice and freezing rain, as well as the fatigue that comes with a midnight start. Additionally, gear wasn’t secured, lifesaving equipment was out of reach, and none of the crew were wearing personal flotation devices (PFDs). On small fishing vessels, capsizes can happen fast and without warning, leaving almost no time to grab or launch lifesaving gear.
Finally, our investigation into the sinking of Silver Condor (M23C0257) tells a similar story. The vessel was likely operating beyond what its stability could safely support, and when conditions worsened, it began to sink. The crew had trouble finding and putting on immersion suits; only five of the eight suits were recovered in time, and two weren’t put on properly. The life raft didn’t float free, so it couldn’t be reached during the evacuation. On top of that, the vessel was operating with an expired safety certificate, a gap in oversight that added even more risk.
The 15 deaths in these four occurrences weren’t random accidents. They were the result of the same problems showing up trip after trip — too much weight, not enough margin of safety and not enough time to respond when it all went wrong.
On the water, vessel stability is critical, and it doesn’t take much to affect it. Decks overloaded with traps, modifications that have not been assessed, or water accumulating on board can quickly push a vessel beyond its safe limits. When that happens, the risk of capsizing or sinking rises sharply. Even small changes in configuration or loading have led to catastrophic outcomes.
TSB investigations have shown that the most common cause of fatalities is entering the water unexpectedly. This makes lifesaving equipment all the more critical in an emergency. Immersion suits, PFDs, rafts and distress alerting devices only work when they’re accessible and ready for use. In sudden emergencies, there is rarely time to search for gear. If equipment is blocked, stowed out of reach, or not maintained, the margin for survival narrows.
Beyond equipment and stability, culture also plays an important role. Commercial fishing is shaped by experience, competition and economic pressures — but these same forces can normalize risk. Fatigue, tight quotas and the drive to maximize catch often overshadow caution. Our investigations repeatedly reveal how decisions made under pressure can push operations beyond safe limits, turning standard trips into tragedies.
These risks are well known, and the TSB has recognized commercial fishing safety as a critical issue for over 30 years. So, why do these safety issues persist?
Safety is a system, and gaps in planning, equipment access, training or culture make the entire operation more vulnerable. When risk becomes routine, small compromises can line up in ways that leave no room to recover once something goes wrong.
Many of the accidents are preventable, but only if the cycle of unsafe practices is broken.
Safety depends on everyone doing their part. Reliable equipment, solid preparation and realistic training make a noticeable difference on the water. Crews benefit from drills that match the conditions they actually face, from cold decks to fast moving gear, so reactions become second nature. Lifesaving equipment and distress alert systems work best when they’re maintained, tested and positioned for quick access before the next trip begins.
Sharing practical knowledge among vessels and within local fleets improves skills and awareness. A culture that encourages speaking up about concerns supports safer decisions when operations get busy. Across the industry, these day-to-day habits lead to stronger crews and safer voyages from one season to the next. Families and communities can also help to strengthen safety culture and support responsible decision making.
A safer future depends on shared responsibility, with regulators and industry improving systems and standards and crews making sound decisions on the water. When both align, progress becomes tangible: one vessel, one crew, one decision at a time.
Yoan Marier is the Chair of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada and has many years of experience in the field of federally regulated transportation and regulatory compliance.
